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DOWNLOAD IT WHILE IT’S HOT:                                                          
OPEN ACCESS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP* 
by                                                                                                                   
Lawrence B. Solum** 
This Article analyzes the shift of legal scholarship from the old world of law 
reviews to today’s world of peer reviews to tomorrow’s world of open access legal 
blogs. This shift is occurring in three dimensions. First, legal scholarship is moving 
from the long form (treatises and law review articles) to the short form (very short 
articles, blog posts, and online collaborations). Second, a regime of exclusive 
rights is giving way to a regime of open access. Third, intermediaries (law school 
editorial boards, peer-reviewed journals) are being supplemented by 
disintermediated forms (papers on the Internet, blogs). Blogs and internet 
conversations between academics are expanding interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship and increasing the avenues of communication among legal scholars, 
practitioners and a wide array of interested laypersons worldwide. 
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 I.   INTRODUCTION: A BLOGGER’S TALE 
In September of 2002, I started a blog.1 On a whim. I barely knew what a 
blog was, and I certainly didn’t know what to do with one. Like a lot of 
bloggers, at first I didn’t even know that the word “blog” was short for web log. 
And I had no clue as to what a web log was—beyond the obvious, that is was 
some kind of “log” on the world wide “web.” To be candid, I had started to 
notice the word “blog” popping up in “cool” venues, and I hated the idea that I 
was already “behind the curve.” So, I looked at a few blogs. I don’t remember 
which ones, but I began to understand that a blog consisted of “posts” or entries 
that formed a kind of online diary or journal. I got the sense that blogs could be 
about almost anything—serious, frivolous, political, cultural, personal, techie. 
Whatever. I posted some posts, got busy with other things, and let the blog lie 
dormant until January of 2003, when I started to post again on a regular basis. 
I called the blog “Legal Theory Blog.” I knew that other law professors 
had blogs—I think that I knew about the Volokh Conspiracy,2 a group blog 
organized by Eugene Volokh of the University of California at Los Angeles 
 
1 See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/ 
2002_09_01_lsolum_archive.html (Sept. 1, 2002). 
2 See The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/. 
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Law School and I might have been aware of “Instapundit,”3 a solo effort by 
Glenn Reynolds of the University of Tennessee Law School. I had a certain 
idea about what the blog might accomplish, based on something else that I was 
just beginning to use extensively as a research tool—the Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN),4 a website and service that provides access on the 
Internet to scholarly papers in a variety of disciplines including law. I wanted to 
do a blog with a focus on “legal theory” broadly conceived as encompassing a 
variety of interdisciplinary approaches to normative and positive legal 
scholarship. What a geek. 
I thought to myself: “I’m reading these papers on SSRN in draft. I could 
blog about some of the papers that I read.” It seemed to me that there might be 
half a dozen potential readers, who would be interested in my postings about 
legal theory papers. Secretly, I hoped that if the blog were a giant success it 
might attract a few dozen readers on a semi-regular basis. And I said to myself, 
“What the heck, if no one reads it, I’ll just stop doing it.” As I recall, my 
expectations were rather low: I believed that it was “too late” for entry into the 
blogging market—which was already dominated by a few “big blogs.” 
Were it not for some positive feedback, I’m almost sure my career as a 
blogger would have ended a few weeks into my second foray. At first the 
feedback came in tiny dribs and drabs. I can actually name the two people who 
are most responsible for the continued existence of “Legal Theory Blog.” Chris 
Bertram and Nathan Oman had blogs of their own at the time. Chris Bertram is 
a philosopher at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom—he had a 
blog called “Junius” and he later became a founding member of a widely read, 
mostly academic group blog called “Crooked Timber.” I don’t remember 
exactly what Bertram said or why, but whatever it was, it made me think that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 See Instapundit.com, http://instapundit.com/. 
4 See Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Home Page, http://ssrn.com/. 
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what I was doing might be appreciated by thoughtful readers. Nate Oman 
recently became a law professor at the College of William and Mary in 
Virginia. At the time, Oman was a first year law student at Harvard with a blog 
called “A Good Oman.” And like Bertram, Oman provided thoughtful and 
appreciative feedback. Bertram and Oman opened my eyes to the blogosphere 
as a distinctive form of social and intellectual interaction—a space for 
communicating about serious ideas. Thanks guys. 
And then something else happened. I read an op/ed in the New York 
Times about a judicial nominee. The editorial focused on a case involving the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) to a case involving 
the tort of spoliation (destruction) of evidence. Well, I’ve written a treatise with 
a chapter on claim preclusion5 and another treatise with a chapter on the 
spoliation tort.6 So I read the case. And it struck me that the editorial was a 
hatchet job or incompetent or both. So I blogged about the editorial. And then 
the blogosphere took over—producing dozens and dozens of “links” to my post 
and thousands and thousands of “visits” to Legal Theory Blog. 
This really wasn’t the kind of attention I was looking for. I get no kicks 
from TV—especially being on it. But there was a lesson in my fifteen minutes 
of fame—an illustration of the awesome power of the Internet for rapid 
dissemination of information. Within a few weeks, Legal Theory Blog had 
hundreds of regular readers. When the readership began to climb into the 
thousands, I realized that an obsession with readership was adding to the not 
inconsiderable burden of getting out the blog on a daily basis. I stopped 
counting. 
 
I learned another lesson about the power of the blogosphere from a series 
of exchanges with Jack Balkin, who then ran Balkinization as a solo blog. I had 
 
5 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 131 (3d ed. 1997). 
6 JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989). 
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posted a detailed reply7 in response to a column by Eddie Lazarus,8 prompting 
Jack Balkin to publish a post entitled “Good Judging and ‘Following the Rules 
Laid Down.’”9 I countered with “A Neoformalist Manifesto,”10 followed by 
Balkin’s “Good Judging and “Following the Rules Laid Down,” Part II.”11 The 
exchange ended with my “Fear and Loathing in New Haven.”12 The exchange, 
conducted over the course of four days, runs almost fourteen thousand words. 
Balkin’s contributions to the exchange were eloquent and powerful. They gave 
me the sense that the possibilities of blogging transcended the one-paragraph 
post; Balkin’s blogging blurred the lines between conventional legal 
scholarship and bloggership. 
Eventually, Legal Theory Blog evolved a fairly standard format. Lots of 
the content consists of links to new papers on SSRN and elsewhere. Every 
week, there is a “Download of the Week” which frequently ends with the tag 
line: download it while its hot! Another weekly feature is a book 
recommendation—called the “Legal Theory Bookworm.” Many law schools, 
 
7 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Blog, Judicial Integrity, Legal Realism and the 
Second Amendment: A Commentary on Lazarus and Kozinski (May 17, 2003), 
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200304841. 
8 Edward Lazarus, A Recent Dissent By Federal Appellate Judge Alex Kozinski Offers 
Rare Candor About the Political Nature of the Judicial Process, FINDLAW, May 15, 2003, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/lazarus/20030515.html. 
9 Jack Balkin, Balkinization, Good Judging and “Following the Rules Laid Down” 
(May 18, 2003), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_balkin_archive.html#94523316. 
10 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Blog, A Neoformalist Manifesto (May 18, 2003), 
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200307682. 
11 Jack Balkin, Balkinization, Good Judging and “Following the Rules Laid Down,” 
Part II (May 18, 2003), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2003_05_18_balkin_archive.html#94561782. 
12 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Blog, Fear and Loathing in New Haven (May 20, 
2003), http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200315303. 
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post open access versions of workshop papers on the web—Legal Theory Blog 
links to those in a weekly “Legal Theory Calendar,” which is reposted day-by-
day, Monday through Friday. Once a week, I post an entry in the Legal Theory 
Lexicon, which covers topics like “The Coase Theorem,” “Ex Post and Ex 
Ante,” and so forth. 
By now, you will have recognized that this blogger’s tale is just as much 
about open access as it is about blogs. The idea of open access scholarship may 
have begun with arXiv.org13—an open access repository for papers in Physics, 
Mathematics, Computer Science and Quantitative Biology that has blossomed 
in myriad ways.14 The concept of open access can be articulated in a variety of 
ways, and its particular forms have changed, but the Budapest Open Access 
Initiative Declaration provides a handy definition: 
By “open access” to this literature, we mean its free availability on the 
public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, 
print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for 
indexing, pass them as data to software, or use them for any other lawful 
purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. The only constraint 
on reproduction and distribution, and the only role for copyright in this 
domain, should be to give authors control over the integrity of their work 
and the right to be properly acknowledged and cited.15 
Open access is what makes Legal Theory Blog possible. The core idea of the 
blog is that open access legal scholarship creates an opportunity for a new kind 
of conversation about, besides, and around the conventional scholarly paper. 
Academic blogs themselves are a form of open access scholarship—a leading 
edge of the emerging “short form.” 
The story of Legal Theory Blog is an introduction to the real work of this 
paper—to investigate in a systematic way the transformation of legal 
scholarship that is being prompted by the open access movement. Oh yeah. I 
almost forgot. This is legal scholarship, so the last paragraph of the introduction 
needs to be a roadmap. The investigation begins in Part II, which outlines 
crucial features of the old world of closed access legal scholarship. The old is 
contrasted with the new in Part III, an investigation of crucial features of the 
emerging world of open-access legal scholarship. This contrast is theorized in 
Part IV, which looks at open access from a variety of theoretical perspectives. I 
return from the theoretical to the personal in Part V, which recounts the 
transformative effects of open access on the form and substance of my own 
scholarly work. 
 
13 Cornell University Library, arXiv.org E-Print Archive, http://arxiv.org/. 
14 See Peter Suber, Timeline of the Open Access Movement, http://www.earlham.edu/ 
~peters/fos/timeline.htm. 
 15 Budapest Open Access Initiative (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.soros.org/openaccess/ 
read.shtml. 
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II. THE OLD WORLD: LONG FORM, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS, AND 
INTERMEDIARIES 
I’m trying to get at the transformative potential of open access legal 
scholarship. That requires a bit of background—a portrait of the ancien regime, 
the old world of treatises and law reviews. The portrait will focus on three 
features of the fading landscape—the long form, exclusive rights, and 
intermediaries. 
A. The Long Form 
Legal scholarship is notorious for the long form. Really long! Back in the 
day, the most influential legal scholars were the treatise writers—the heirs of 
Blackstone and Chancellor Kent—you know the names: Corbin, Davis, Moore, 
Nimmer, Wigmore, Williston, and Wright. And let us not forget the last great 
modern treatise—Tribe’s American Constitutional Law—an attempt to 
revitalize a dying tradition by infusing old-fashioned case crunching with new-
fangled theory. The multivolume treatises were and are long. Really long! 
Dozens of volumes. Millions of words. Cases in the tens of thousands. 
By comparison, law review articles seem blissfully short. Oh sure, there 
was the occasional multipart law review article that ran to hundreds of pages 
and thousands of footnotes. But a mere 60 to 100 pages was considered a 
respectable length for a serious piece of legal scholarship—one that took a 
doctrinal topic and turned it inside out and upside down, comprehensively 
surveying the literature and the authoritative legal materials. 
There was, of course, a terrible dirty secret about long form legal 
scholarship. No one read it. Of course, the treatises weren’t meant to be read 
straight through. They were giant encyclopedias of doctrine. The reader was 
invited to dip into the treatise on a particular topic and read a section or even a 
few. No one was supposed to read the whole thing. And because the treatises 
were comprehensive, but legal problems cluster, it is likely that some sections 
of the treatises had very few readers even when cumulated over a number of 
years—numbered perhaps in the dozens, perhaps in the single digits. Of course, 
a really successful treatise had readers aplenty—thousands and tens of 
thousands of lawyers, judges, academics, and students who wanted to know 
what “the rule” was on this or that topic. 
But the law review articles! Readers? That one word question is its own 
best answer. Question: “Readers?” Answer: “Readers??” Don’t get me wrong. 
There were success stories. A few law review articles drew amazing 
readerships. Many law review articles are read by small but important scholarly 
communities. But the vast majority of long form law review articles had very 
few readers. Some had none—except maybe their authors and editors. That’s 
hardly a surprise. Law review articles are published by the thousands, but their 
length and density is forbidding. And because law review articles are selected 
by students, legal academics tend to rehearse well-known arguments at length 
in order to enable the student editors to understand the new contribution that 
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the article makes. Very long articles on obscure topics are rarely worth reading, 
and so they aren’t read. 
Paul Caron has made this point in an article that appears in the Yale Law 
Journal’s online adjunct, The Pocket Part. Caron writes: 
Does the long tail theory apply to the market for legal scholarship? Data 
from Tom Smith’s ongoing research project, The Web of Law, paints 
legal scholarship as a hit-driven market, in contrast to the long tail 
theory’s predictions. Smith’s data from LexisNexis’s Shepard’s database 
of 385,000 articles published in 726 law reviews reveals a classic 80/20 
distribution of citations in cases and other law review articles: the top 
17% of articles get 79% of all citations. The head of the tail is enormous, 
as the top 0.5% of articles get 18% of all citations, and the top 5.2% of 
articles get 50% of all citations. The tail ends abruptly, as 40% of articles 
are never cited at all.16 
The long form is alive and well, but even before the advent of open access, 
legal academics were moving towards short form legal scholarship. Some law 
reviews began to encourage the submission of “essays,” essentially short law 
review articles.17 Recently, several prominent law reviews issued a “Joint 
Statement on Article Length,” which stated, “The vast majority of law review 
articles can effectively convey their arguments within the range of 40–70 law 
review pages, and any impression that law reviews only publish or strongly 
prefer lengthier articles should be dispelled.”18 Of course, by the standards of 
many disciplines 40 pages of small-type law review pages would be considered 
extraordinarily long. 
B. Exclusive Rights 
The old world was a world of exclusive rights—especially the exclusive 
right to make copies. That is, the old world was the world of copyrights. And 
these rights were usually held by publishers, although sometimes they were 
retained by authors. The publishers of treatises hold the copyright or exclusive 
licenses that provide the equivalent rights of exclusion. And the typical law 
review publication agreement involved an assignment of copyright from the 
author to the law review (or educational institution of which the law journal 
was a part). 
But there is something funny about that pattern. Something odd. It makes 
perfect sense that the treatises were copyrighted and that those copyrights 
would be enforced. Treatises were (and are still) published by for-profit 
enterprises. In the old world, publication was Expensive—with a capital E. 
 
16 Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38 
(2006), http://thepocketpart.org/content/view/59/6/. 
17 See Yale Law Journal, Submissions, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/ 
submissions.html (describing distinction between articles and “essays” and stating, “Essays 
are usually significantly leaner than Articles: in general, they occupy fewer pages and rely 
on less voluminous citation.”). 
18 See Yale Law Journal, Joint Statement on Article Length, 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/joint_statement.html. 
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Typesetting. Printing presses. Shipping. It got cheaper. Electronic text 
preparation. Printing presses in China. Containers and UPS. But still, 
expensive—maybe with a small-case “e.” And we all know the familiar story 
about the economics of intellectual property. Exclusive rights create the 
incentives to invest in the creation and dissemination of new works. Without 
them, Wigmore on Evidence would have been “ripped off” by some 
entrepreneurial outfit which would have had lower production costs, because it 
would not have had to pay either Wigmore or Little Brown’s editorial staff. 
So the treatise part of the story wasn’t odd, but what about law review 
articles? Anyone who writes law review articles will tell you that the copyrights 
in them are virtually worthless. Try auctioning one on eBay or selling it to a 
publisher. It is true that law reviews charge for subscriptions, but it doesn’t 
seem likely that copyrights are necessary to protect that income stream. For one 
thing, law reviews operate with free labor and subsidized direct costs. It’s not 
clear that a for-profit enterprise, which would have to pay for labor and the 
costs of capital, could compete. For another thing, copyrights in law review 
articles create problems. A famous example is Lon Fuller’s famous article, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,19 published in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1958. Fuller retained the copyright, but after his death, 
obtaining permission to use the article in course packets and anthologies 
became impossible—the orphan work problem. And what is the point of that? 
Legal academics want to be read, but exclusive rights are barriers to readership! 
Even if permission is freely granted, seeking it is costly. If identification of the 
rights holder is difficult, then the transaction costs are likely to pose an 
insurmountable barrier. 
One important implication of exclusive rights is directly relevant to open 
access. Holders of exclusive rights are frequently reluctant to grant open 
access, because open access makes unauthorized copying virtually costless and 
undetectable. Academic presses and legal publishers do not permit open access 
to the monographs they publish.20 Many student-edited law reviews have begun 
to permit open access. I now insist on open access as a condition of publication, 
and my experience is that most law reviews are willing to modify their 
publication agreements to permit open access. Many law reviews now routinely 
post open access versions of the articles they publish on their websites. 
But peer-reviewed journals are different. Most peer-reviewed journals are 
published by academic or for-profit presses that view the content of these 
journals as their intellectual property and as a potential source of revenue. 
Increasingly, peer-reviewed journals are available in electronic form, via 
JSTOR or other closed, proprietary electronic data bases, but access to these 
databases is expensive. Very expensive. Just ask a librarian. Individual articles 
 
19 Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
20 The exception that proves the rule is Larry Lessig’s Free Culture. See LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freecontent/. 
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may be available for download in exchange for payment of a one-time fee, but 
these fees may be cost-prohibitive. Thirty dollars for a single copy of a single 
article is a typical fee. 
So I will not publish in any peer-reviewed journal without open access. 
And that means that for all practical purposes, I will not publish in peer-
reviewed journals. As of today, they are dinosaurs. Magnificent beasts, to be 
sure. But they will evolve or become extinct. 
C. Intermediaries 
The ancien regime stood on three legs—the long form, exclusive rights, 
and intermediation—the institutions and individuals that controlled access to 
legal scholarship. Let’s take a hard look at the intermediaries. One way to slice 
and dice the intermediation pie is to distinguish between “source 
intermediaries” (publishers) and “search intermediaries” or (indexers). Both 
were important. First, let’s take a look at source intermediaries. 
1. Source Intermediaries 
In the old world of legal scholarship, source intermediaries stood between 
authors and audiences. For reasons both historical and economic, the form of 
intermediation varied depending on whether the mode of publication was serial 
or monograph. 
a. The Law Reviews and Peer-Reviewed Journals 
With respect to serials, let’s distinguish between thirty years ago and last 
week. Thirty years ago, the publishers were the law reviews. And the law 
reviews were (and are) edited by law students—an arrangement that was 
unique in the academy and the source of much consternation. The reasons for 
the consternation are obvious and familiar. Second and third year law students 
are not experienced legal scholars. They are likely to reject important new 
scholarship when they fail to comprehend its significance. They are likely to 
accept bad scholarship that “sounds impressive” or addresses a “hot topic.” 
Because students are not well-acquainted with the literature, they are likely to 
favor scholarship that rehearses old arguments before adding a new point. Of 
course, law students aren’t stupid. They are likely to understand their own 
limitations, and that creates another problem. If student editors cannot trust 
their own judgment, then they are likely to rely on “proxy variables,” e.g. the 
institutional affiliations of authors or their prior record of publication. 
Over the course of the last thirty years, law reviews have increasingly been 
supplanted by peer-reviewed journals. The upside is sophisticated judgment. 
Experienced academics are better equipped to separate the wheat from the 
chaff. But there are downsides as well. The editors of peer-reviewed journals 
are embedded in social networks of professional affiliation. Although the very 
best editors may transcend all bias, anyone who has knocked around academia 
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knows that there is a seamy underside to the world of peer review.21 Some 
theories are favored, others dissed. The former students of the powerful prosper 
at the expense of those who have studied with the unpopular or the obscure. 
Deals are made—and as we all know, you can make a deal without ever 
discussing the terms. A wink and a nod will do. 
And then there is the problem of time. One of the really nice things about 
student-edited law reviews is that they are fast. Student-edited journals permit 
multiple simultaneous submissions. This creates competition between journals 
to make rapid decisions about the best articles. (I’ve had an article accepted 
within six hours of submission, and I’m sure that’s nowhere near the record.) 
But peer-reviewed journals generally require exclusive submissions—in order 
to reduce the burden on readers, who are themselves prominent and busy 
academics. Student-edited journals can make decisions in days or even hours. 
Peer-reviewed journals take weeks or months. When combined with exclusive 
submission, this means that the publication of an important article can be 
delayed for years. And if you’ve been around the business, you know about 
 
21 For a rare public airing of these issues, see Brian Leiter, Leiter Reports, Time to End 
In-House Editing of Leading Philosophy Journals (Aug. 28, 2006), 
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2006/09/time_to_end_inh.html: 
Patricia Smith Churchland at the University of California at San Diego and Daniel 
Dennett at Tufts University write with the following apt comments about the editorial 
practices of some of our profession’s most visible journals: 
Several of us old guys have often discussed the unprofessional nature of the so-
called premier journals in our discipline. We shall restrict ourselves to mentioning 
Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Review. First, both are “in house” 
journals, meaning, as we understand it, that the editor (at Columbia and Cornell 
respectively) standardly selects faculty from his/her department to review papers. 
Papers are not standardly sent out for peer review. This makes the journals 
vulnerable to a certain kind of corruption and cronyism that would not be tolerated 
in the sciences. We know of no first ranked journal in the natural or social 
sciences that operates that way, or second-ranked journal either, for that matter. 
Our casual survey of scientists revealed that the “in house” refereeing system is 
regarded as completely unprofessional. Obviously the “in house” policy also 
means that from time to time people who are not particularly competent are 
reviewing submitted manuscripts. The policy may also partially explain the 
absurdly long time it takes for manuscripts to be reviewed. 
May we also add that the journal—Philosophical Psychology—whose editor, Bill 
Bechtel, is in the department at UCSD, does not operate as an “in house” journal 
but according to the professional criteria in the natural and social sciences. 
Philosophy of Science also abides by a peer review practice, and its location 
moves as a function of its term-limited editor, who is selected by the Philosophy 
of Science Society. 
The “in house” practice of refereeing at Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical 
Review is likely an innocent relic of earlier times. It is easily corrected. 
I recall a time in the early 1990s (around when I cancelled my subscription) when we used to 
refer to the Journal of Philosophy as the Journal of Philosophy and Decision Theory, given 
the preposterously large number of papers on decision theory it published, due to the 
influence of Isaac Levi, then a senior member of the Columbia department and an influential 
editor of the Journal. Another pernicious, it seems to me, aspect of the in-house editing at 
J.Phil. in particular is that its rather precious book review space is given over 
disproportionately to books by Columbia faculty. 
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articles—really fine ones—that simply sit in a drawer after two or three 
rejections (and that may have involved two or three years of waiting). Who 
needs the aggravation?! Why bother? 
b. Legal and Academic Presses 
As with serials, so with monographs. There was the old world of legal 
publishers. The once familiar names are fading, even as I write. Where have 
you gone, Little Brown? Are you still here, West Publishing? Why did you 
leave me, Matthew-Bender? The new international publishing firms are taking 
their place. Thompson. Kluwer. LexisNexis. The for-profit legal publishers 
aimed solidly at their most important and profitable market—practicing 
lawyers. That was all well and good in the era of doctrinal scholarship. But 
once interdisciplinarity took hold of the legal academy, the for-profit legal 
publishers simply did not provide an outlet, prestigious or otherwise, for the 
kinds of books that sophisticated legal academics wanted to write. Because 
these books were not aimed at practitioners. They were aimed at other legal 
academics and at philosophers, political scientists, economists, historians, and 
others. 
Enter the academic presses. Of course, there were law books by academic 
presses even in the heyday of the treatise. “Jurisprudence” was part of the legal 
academy even before there was “Philosophy of Law.” Constitutional theory 
crossed disciplines, creating a market for monographs of interest to political 
scientists, political philosophers, and constitutional academic-lawyers. But in 
the new millennium, the prestige venue is the academic press. The goal of the 
ambitious law professor is no longer the treatise published by Thompson. The 
new goal is the three-hundred page monograph published by a venerated 
academic press. Harvard University Press. Oxford University Press. Princeton 
University Press. Cambridge University Press. You know, more or less, how it 
goes from there. 
There is an irony here. Academic legal monographs provide a substitute 
for the really long law review article. The one hundred page law review article 
becomes the three hundred page book published by a university press. But there 
are costs associated with this move. Whatever was formerly the case, most 
university presses must now “float on their own bottom.” That is, they are 
expected to turn a profit or at least break even. Constitutional law and theory 
books sell. Contract theory books? Maybe not. Whereas the law reviews 
published short monographs as articles without regard to the bottom line, the 
academic presses cannot afford this luxury. Obscure areas of law without 
interdisciplinary appeal are poor candidates for book contracts. And in the era 
of the fifty-page limit on article length, the question is, “Where do those 
articles go?” Is the short, specialized legal monograph to be confined to the 
dustbin of history? 
2. Search Intermediaries 
The old world involved a second form of intermediation—the role played 
by what I call “search intermediaries.” Once again, the status quo consists of a 
mix between the antiquated, card catalogs and indexes, and the once new (but 
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now newly obsolete), that is closed access full-text searching on Lexis and 
Westlaw. 
a. Card Catalogs and the Index to Legal Periodicals 
Card catalogs! As I’m writing this, I have the most wonderful memory of 
the card catalog of the main library at Harvard University. A giant beast of a 
catalog. Gone now. The old-old world of 3” by 5” cardstock gave rise to the 
new-old world of electronic card catalogs. But there is a difference. I still use 
electronic card catalogs—not every day or every week, but once in a while. 
Why? Because every so often, I need a book published by a traditional legal 
publisher. And those books are ridiculously expensive. So I don’t order them 
from Amazon.com. I use the electronic card catalog to find those books on the 
shelf, but I am not sure that I have used an electronic card catalog to do 
research in several years. 
Remember the Index to Legal Periodicals? You were at the mercy of the 
classification system and the attention span of the classifiers. Who knows how 
good that system really was? Funny that it still exists. I suppose it carries on 
because of the momentum of library subscriptions and the increasingly 
untenable notion that students need to learn to do research the “old-fashioned 
way” so that they don’t become “over reliant” on electronic searches. I used to 
buy that. Crap. Don’t you think? 
b. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis 
The old-old world of indexes and card catalogs gave way to the new-old 
world of closed electronic text databases. There were (and are) two, in the 
United States anyway—Westlaw and LexisNexis. These databases store vast 
quantities of legal text—cases, statutes, regulations, law review articles, and 
treatises. The data permits the generation of what is called a concordance, 
which correlates words with locations. The existence of a concordance permits 
Boolean searching. For example, I can search for the word “Coase” 
immediately preceding the word “Theorem” and get all instances of the phrase 
“Coase theorem” in a given database. The logical operators “AND,” “OR,” and 
“NOT” are permitted as are proximity variables, such as “Coase” within two 
words of “Theorem.” Boolean searches are powerful. 
But the new-old world of Westlaw and LexisNexis is not nirvana, because 
these databases are proprietary and closed. They are proprietary—access to the 
search engines is expensive. They are closed—the databases are not searchable 
by Internet search engines such as Google. That means that only a tiny fraction 
of the global population of academics and students has meaningful access to 
these systems. Of course, the fraction that does have access is an important 
fraction—it includes most all of the academics in the North Atlantic and 
Commonwealth democracies—and hence, most of the “significant” legal 
scholars. Sorry, civil law gals and guys. We’re pretty parochial on this side of 
the pond. 
* * * 
That’s the old world. Nostalgia. Law review articles and treatises. 
Exclusive publication rights. Card catalogs. The Index of Legal Periodicals. 
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Even things that were new, not so long ago, are now like familiar pieces of 
furniture. Academic press books and peer-reviewed journals. Westlaw and 
LexisNexis. JSTOR and HeinOnline. But the old world is giving way. Radical 
change is already upon us—a new world. Short form. Open Access. 
Disintermediation. 
III. THE NEW WORLD: SHORT FORM, OPEN ACCESS, AND 
DISINTERMEDIATION 
Let’s get right to it. After all, who wants a long windup for a subsection 
that is titled . . . 
A. . . . Short Form 
I want to focus on the emergence of short form legal scholarship, but first 
a disclaimer. I love the long form. I like big fat law review articles. I think the 
new word limits are idiotic. Some topics need ten thousand words. Some topics 
need eighty thousand. It all depends on the subject-matter, arguments, 
evidence, and claims that are being made. Articles should be as long as they 
need to be—no longer, but no shorter. The assertion that “[t]he vast majority of 
law review articles can effectively convey their arguments within the range of 
40–70 law review pages” is almost surely correct, but that assertion hardly 
justifies a set of rules that effectively operate to eliminate longer articles. 
Because even if the majority of law review articles should be under 50 or 70 
pages, there is a significant minority that should be longer—especially in 
subfields where academic publishers see no market for monographs. 
Now, for another dirty secret. Getting the length of law review articles 
“right” was never the motivation for the adoption of the new policy. As any 
insider to the process will tell you, the real justification was much simpler. The 
law review editors didn’t want to do the work of reading very long articles. 
They thought that word limits would reduce their workload. Of course, any law 
professor will tell you what we are doing in response. We can satisfy the word 
limits. That’s easy. The project that would have been one eighty page article is 
now two fifty page articles. Unintended consequences. You betcha! I will go 
out on a limb and make a prediction. The word limits will not reduce the total 
quantity of words produced by legal scholars and hence the total workload of 
law review editors. Quite the contrary. Fewer words per article means more 
articles on related topics, and given the overhead, the shared introductory 
content, the ultimate impact is to increase rather than decrease the number of 
words written and submitted. 
I love the long form, but the long form is so yesterday. The new world is 
the world of the short form. Music videos, not movies. Singles (in MP3 format, 
of course), not symphonies. Haiku,22 not epic poetry. The short form in legal 
 
22 See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Blog, Chen, Farber, & Gilmore Write Onlaw 
Haiku (Sept. 8, 2006), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/09/chen_farber_gil.html: 
These con law haiku 
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scholarship is just beginning to emerge. But the short form is not the fifty page 
law review article—that’s still the long form. So what will the short form look 
like? I think the best strategy is to briefly canvass the possibilities: 
• The idea paper—One possibility is “the idea paper.” These have 
actually been around for a long time. In the early stages of a 
project, you have “the idea”—the central thesis that will be the 
part of the article that is actually new and moves the literature 
forward. So you write a very short paper—perhaps twenty double-
spaced pages—that sets out the idea. In the old days, the idea 
paper might be presented at a “brown bag” or “early stage 
workshop.” But these days, the idea paper can be thrown up on 
SSRN. And that has important consequences. It allows the author 
to “stake out” the idea—to establish “ownership” for the purpose 
of determining “who came up with it first.” And SSRN allows 
wide circulation. 
• The blog post—Another possibility is the blog post. When, I first 
began to blog, I assumed that blog posts had to follow rules. That 
they had to be short. That they had to be accessible and or even 
entertaining. Now I think that the possibilities of the blog (or 
whatever might replace blogs) have only begun to emerge. For 
example, I did a series of posts on Legal Theory Blog about a 
book by Larry Lessig under the rubric, “Legal Theory Bookclub.” 
At the request of the editors of the Texas Law Review, the series 
of posts became “The Future of Copyright.” Randy Picker’s Mob 
Blog, which produces online symposia about various topics and 
articles, is another innovative form. SCOTUS Blog has done some 
very interesting things by inviting scholars and practitioners to 
produce an online discussion about new Supreme Court cases on 
the day they are handed down. 
• The Wikipedia article—Wikipedia itself is a collaborative, open-
source, open access encyclopedia. The technology underlying 
Wikipedia is the wiki—an engine that permits collaborative 
authorship on the Web. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
is closed—you must be invited to write an article—but it provides 
not quite “open” access content of an extremely high quality. One 
can imagine some hybrid of these forms emerging as a substitute 
for the traditional treatise. Dozens of scholars might collaborate 
on an online wiki-driven contracts treatise, with all the advantages 
of massive, parallel editing and input. 
• The listserv message. Should I include this? Listservs are so 
nineties. But some listservs remain vibrant. And listservs that are 
archived on the web still play a role in creating accessible content 
that digests new legal developments in real time. Listserv 
contributions may not be the short form of the future, but they 
 
Tell law with style and rhythm. 
Download and enjoy. 
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point to need for interactive scholarship in a space reserved for 
serious discussion. 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive. I suspect that the possibilities of the 
short form are only beginning to emerge. Wikis and blogs are engines—they 
are the platforms that allow for innovation in the development of the short 
form. It may be that these platforms have already created the space in which the 
“normal” version of short form legal scholarship will emerge. It may be that 
new platforms will open up possibilities for the short form that we cannot yet 
see. To me, the shape of the future is still dim. But the length of the future is in 
clear focus: ess ache oh ar tee. 
B. Open Access 
The old world was exclusive rights. The new world is open access. Open 
access is important because it reduces the cost of legal scholarship to readers. 
In the old world, you had to go to the library, get the volume of the law review 
off the shelf, and make a photocopy. That was costly. If you were a law 
professor, some of these costs might be subsidized. You might be able to shift 
the costs from your research budget to the library. Or you could have a research 
assistant do the fetching and copying. But it was costly enough that you didn’t 
want to have to do it twice, and we all accumulated photocopies by the 
hundreds, neatly organized in files or piled up in huge disorganized stacks. If 
you weren’t a law professor, the costs were considerably higher, and every law 
student from a certain era will remember taking copious notes and copying out 
passages by hand. Very costly. 
Open access means doing an online search and downloading the article. 
When you’re done, you might save it on your hard drive or you might just 
delete it. Because you can always find it and download it again in a matter of 
minutes or even seconds. There is a digital divide; not everyone has high-speed 
Internet access, but most academics and students do—almost universally in the 
most developed world and selectively elsewhere. Wherever there is high-speed 
Internet, open access dramatically reduces the cost of legal scholarship. 
The term “open access” is fraught with emotional and ideological 
overtones, the echoes of the copywars. I would like to suggest that what we 
might call the “ideal type” of pure open access is a focal point in logical space, 
around which a variety of hybrid forms of impure openness cluster. Jeez. What 
a sentence that was. Let me try to break it down. 
Let’s start by defining full-blooded or pure open access, using the 
Budapest Declaration as the starting point. That definition has eleven elements: 
1. A price of zero; 
2. Availability on the Internet; 
3. Permission to download; 
4. Permission to copy; 
5. Permission to distribute; 
6. Permission to print; 
7. Permission to do full text searches; 
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8. Permission to link; 
9. Permission to crawl for the purpose of indexing; 
10. Permission to pass the text as data to programs or applications; 
11. The absence of contractual obligations for users, other than those 
required “to give authors control over the integrity of their work 
and the right to be properly acknowledged and cited.” 
One can imagine forms of open access that include some, but not all of 
these eleven requirements. Consider, for example, the form of open access that 
is embodied in the first footnote of this article, which I shall repeat here: 
© 2006 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this 
paper for scholarly or teaching purposes, including permission to 
reproduce multiple copies or post on the Internet for classroom use and to 
quote extended passages in scholarly work, subject only to the 
requirement that this copyright notice, the title of the Article, and the 
name of the author be prominently included in the copy or extended 
excerpt. Permission is hereby granted to use short excerpts (500 words or 
less) with an appropriate citation and without inclusion of a copyright 
notice. In the event of the death or permanent incapacity of the author, all 
claims to copyright in the work are relinquished and the work is 
dedicated to the public domain in perpetuity. 
The permissions created by the footnote fall short of full-blooded open 
access in several ways. The intent of the footnote is to allow downloading, 
copying, distribution, and redistribution of this article, but only for limited 
purposes. For example, I did not intend to give permission to anthologize the 
article without my permission—at least not until I’m dead or incapacitated. I 
did intend to allow someone to download the article and then upload it to their 
own website. I want to preserve the conditions of the copyright notice for 
reposted or photocopied versions, but not for short excerpts by which I mean 
the typical “block quote” excerpts that scholars use. 
As a practical matter, the most common form of “open access” in the legal 
academy is created by the posting of articles on SSRN. But, of course, posting 
on SSRN falls far short of the eleven elements in the Budapest Declaration. 
Articles posted on SSRN are available on the Internet and can be downloaded, 
but unless the article itself grants further permissions, the downloaded version 
cannot be recopied or reposted. SSRN abstracts can be crawled, but SSRN does 
not currently permit full-text searching. And this final point is quite important: 
Because SSRN does not permit full-text searching, it falls short of the full 
promise of open access. Which brings me directly to my next topic. 
C. Disintermediation 
The old world of legal scholarship was a world of intermediaries. Student 
law review editors. The editorial boards of peer-reviewed journals. The editors 
and advisory boards of the academic presses and legal publishers. The new 
world of legal scholarship is about disintermediation, a fancy word for getting 
rid of the intermediaries. The new world of legal scholarship is 
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disintermediated. Well, that’s not exactly right. Because there are new 
intermediaries and the old ones haven’t gone away. 
Consider SSRN. SSRN mimics the form of the peer-reviewed journals—
but with thin rather than thick review. You can’t just post anything to SSRN. It 
is “peer-reviewed.” But SSRN doesn’t have space constraints. So the threshold 
for “acceptance” is low. You can’t post your recipe collection or a rant about 
people who use cell phones in public places. But you probably can post an 
article that advances a fairly kooky legal theory. (Of course, you could 
probably have gotten it published in a law review as well.) SSRN circulates (by 
email) abstracting journals, organized by subject matter and institution. These 
perform mediating functions, but there is no pretence of selecting only the 
“best” pieces. Everything written by serious academics will be abstracted in the 
appropriate journal. 
Of course, you don’t really need SSRN to put your stuff up on the web. 
You can upload it to a server and put a link on your personal or institutional 
home page. The link makes the paper accessible to a web crawler, which then 
can provide the full text to the database of a search engine such as Google. In 
some ways, this solution is superior to SSRN—because SSRN does not 
facilitate full text searching. But SSRN has advantages as well. Even though it 
is absurdly easy to create your own web page and upload articles to a server, 
many (perhaps most) law professors don’t have a clue as to how these simple 
tasks can be accomplished. SSRN provides a reasonably simple method for 
posting on the web, and many law schools provide administrative support for 
those who find SSRN’s simple interface to be daunting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Well, I’ve been dancing around the “Big Kahuna” of disintermediation: 
Google. At a conceptual level, the real Big Kahuna is the search engine, but 
Google dominates that business and provides a convenient focus for discussion. 
Google is not a perfect search engine. It does not produce a concordance of the 
Internet and therefore it cannot provide the full range of Boolean searches 
offered by Westlaw and Lexis. Other than “AND” and “OR,” Google lacks 
Boolean operators. 
But despite Google’s limitations, Google is the driving force for the 
disintermediation of legal scholarship. Google itself is accessible to anyone 
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who has access to the Internet. Google is very easy to use. Google is fast. 
Google is free. The combination of Google with open access is incredibly 
powerful, because it allows for a “direct connection” between authors and 
readers. I put the phrase “direct connection” in scare quotes because, of course, 
Google itself is an intermediary. Google doesn’t present links in random order. 
It rank orders search results and the precise method for producing the rank 
order is a trade secret. But Google’s success depends on the value delivered by 
the rank ordering. Google wants to get the most relevant and useful results to 
the top of the rank ordering. Indeed, Google offers users the option of searching 
with the “I’m feeling lucky” option that will take the user directly to the 
number one link in the rank ordering. 
If you are old-fashioned like me, it may bother you that we are about to 
enter an era when all research will be done on Google or the rival that beats 
Google to the development of the next great search technology. Well, not all 
research, of course. Westlaw and LexisNexis are not going away tomorrow. 
Ph.D. candidates, students writing their law review notes, and young associates 
at big firms will all be required to do exhaustive searches using multiple 
techniques. But undergraduates, ordinary folks and even professionals in cost-
conscious environments are increasingly becoming reliant on Google as the 
only method for doing ordinary, down and dirty research. 
* * * 
And the new role of Google has an enormously important consequence. 
There will come a day when the saying, “If it isn’t on the net, it doesn’t exist,” 
is true. Open access legal scholarship will be the only legal scholarship that is 
actually read. Closed access legal scholarship will be the tree that falls with no 
one in the forest. The correct metaphysics will confirm its existence, but the 
best epistemology will question the significance (but not the truth) of that 
judgment. 
IV. THE ECOLOGY OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
So far, my investigation has been most descriptive. I’ve talked about the 
old and the new worlds of legal scholarship and described the moves from long 
form to short form, from exclusive rights to open access, and from 
intermediaries to disintermediation. In this Part of the Article, I want to dig a 
bit deeper into the why questions. What are the driving forces? 
A. The Economics of Legal Scholarship 
We can begin with the economics of legal scholarship—viewed in a fairly 
simple and common-sense way. Let’s start with the supply side. 
1. Supply Side: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards 
Why do legal scholars write legal scholarship? Of course, the answer 
depends on the individual, but almost every really good legal scholar will tell 
you that they like to think and write about legal problems and issues. We’ve all 
heard someone say, “I would pay them to let me do this.” I want to call this 
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motivation “intrinsic.” Legal scholarship is pursued for its own sake because it 
produces intrinsic rewards. Let’s not worry too much about why this is the 
case. Maybe it is natural for humans to want to understand their world. Maybe 
legal scholars are just geeks who got stroked by their parents and teachers for 
writing boring papers. For my purpose, the important thing about the intrinsic 
rewards of legal scholarship is that they are not limited to doing the writing. 
The intrinsic rewards include being read and having an influence on the way 
that others think about the law. That’s why we get a kick out of being cited, an 
even bigger kick about being discussed in text, and a real thrill when we 
persuade others to see things our way. 
Of course, legal scholars are flesh and blood human beings. They are 
motivated by extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards. Sometimes there is a 
conflict between the two. Writing the boring treatise may be lucrative, whereas 
the serious scholarly article may not produce any immediate payoff. The 
pursuit of recognition is one thing, but the pursuit of fame is another. And the 
production of scholarship can lead to the conventional rewards that are doled 
out to successful academics—a bigger salary, more travel money, an endowed 
Chair, a program or center, even a better office or parking space! (At certain 
universities, parking spaces are the ultimate academic perk—beyond price.) 
When these rewards are dished out, readership becomes important for another 
reason. Universities and other institutions that support legal scholarship reward 
scholars who are widely read, cited, and discussed. The most prestigious chairs 
and the highest promotion steps conventionally required evidence of an 
“international reputation,” which is nothing more than international readership. 
Scholars whose work is unrecognized and unread are less likely to receive the 
extrinsic rewards. 
So both the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for doing legal scholarship 
are responsive to readership. The short form, open access, and 
disintermediation create opportunities for getting more readers. When I give 
advice to younger colleagues about scholarship, I always say, “You get readers 
one at a time.” I still say that, because there is a sense in which it is still true. 
Good serious readers are frequently the result of personal connections made at 
conventions and conferences. That’s the retail side of selling one’s scholarship. 
But the short form, open access, and disintermediation create the possibility of 
wholesaling—of reaching many, many readers, who stumble across your paper 
as a result of a Google search or who read a post on your blog that leads them 
on to your long-form article. 
2. Demand Side: Source Costs and Search Costs 
The flip side of the supply side story is the demand side. Demand curves 
slope downward and to the right. Lower prices translate into more demand. The 
short form, open access, and disintermediation all combine to lower prices. 
The short form lowers prices by reducing the opportunity costs associated 
with processing legal scholarship. Reading very long articles takes time which 
could be spent doing other valuable things—like writing one’s own articles. If 
the valuable idea can be communicated via the short form, then the cost for 
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others of acquiring the idea is reduced and hence the demand for the idea will 
increase. 
Open access lowers prices in an obvious way. Open access is free. Open 
access on the Internet does involve costs. Internet access itself is not free, and 
downloading a paper may take quite some time on a dial-up connection. But 
once you have access to a high-speed Internet connection, the marginal costs of 
accessing legal scholarship (e.g. by downloading a paper from SSRN) are 
likely to be very low, especially in comparison to the costs of accessing closed 
access sources. 
Disintermediation is more ambiguous. In some ways, the old world 
intermediaries reduced search costs, but in other ways they created barriers to 
access. This topic requires elaboration and is the subject of the next subsection. 
B. The Role of Intermediaries 
Intermediaries perform a variety of functions, which interact in different 
ways with the ecology of the legal academy. Let’s make a list. 
1. Screening 
Most obviously, intermediaries perform a screening function. Editorial 
boards determine what gets published and what doesn’t. This screening 
function imposes costs on authors. Rejections are time consuming and, for 
many authors, rejections involve emotional wear and tear. The combination of 
delay and psychic cost means that screening prevents significant amounts of 
scholarship from reaching its target audience in a timely fashion. Timing is 
important, both because legal issues are time sensitive and because scholarly 
debates are time bound—issues become stale and the attention of scholarly 
communities moves from old to new topics. 
2. Certification 
Intermediaries perform a certification function that may reduce search 
costs. If it’s in the Yale Law Journal, it must be good. (Well, no one believes 
that. But they may believe, “If it’s in the Yale Law Journal, there’s a good 
chance it’s decent.”) If it is in the Journal of Legal Studies, it’s probably pretty 
good—that’s actually a good bet. Peer-reviewed journals do a much better job 
of certifying quality than do student-edited law reviews.23 Of course, it works 
the other way as well. There are some peer-reviewed journals that one can 
 
23 David Luban disagrees: 
These are the people who have always bridled at the idea that law students rather than 
peer reviewers should decide what counts as meritorious scholarship. I have never taken 
this problem seriously. Comparing the quality of articles in the top student-edited law 
reviews with the quality of articles in the top peer-reviewed philosophy journals (my 
own scholarly point of reference), I have never been able to detect superiority in the 
peer-reviewed philosophy journals. By and large, I think that law review editors—at 
least at the top law reviews, where the editors have an embarrassment of riches to 
choose from—have been pretty good gatekeepers. 
David Luban, Balkinization, Online Legal Scholarship: Thoughts Provoked by Jack’s Essay 
(Sept. 10, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/09/online-legal-scholarship-thoughts.html. 
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count on to publish utter dreck. We might call this “decertification.” But even 
less prestigious student-edited law reviews occasionally publish a truly path 
breaking article. 
Certification may reduce search costs, but it has other functions as well. 
Publication in a prestigious peer-reviewed journal or competitive student-edited 
law review enhances professional reputation. This certification function may 
also play a role in promotion and tenure decisions as well as lateral hiring 
decisions. Extrinsic rewards, such as salary and other perks may depend, in 
part, on certification. 
3. Dissemination 
Intermediaries also play a role in the dissemination of legal scholarship. 
The Harvard Law Review and the Yale Law Journal have large subscriber 
bases, as do some peer-reviewed journals. A good academic or legal press can 
increase the readership of a monograph with effective promotion. Unmediated 
open access scholarship is widely available, but availability does not imply 
dissemination. This is a powerful force that favors the continued existence of 
those intermediaries that can deliver dissemination. 
4. Targeting 
Another role played by intermediaries is targeting or matching authors and 
readers. When a paper is published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, I know 
that there is a reasonably good chance that I will find the paper interesting and 
worth reading. On the other hand, if a paper is published in Political Theory, 
there is a good chance that I will find the paper uninteresting, even if it is on a 
topic that intrigues me. For many intelligent readers, the push and pull of these 
two journals will be reversed. This targeting function reduces search costs and 
hence increases readership. 
5. Feedback 
Intermediaries play another important role. They provide direct feedback 
to authors. This is especially true in the case of peer-reviewed journals, which 
can provide high quality feedback that may result in significant improvements 
to the paper. Of course, working papers also provide the opportunity for 
feedback, but the amount of feedback received from simply posting a paper on 
the Internet is likely to be highly variable. Submission to a peer-reviewed 
journal doesn’t guarantee good comments, but it makes it fairly likely one will 
get them. Posting a paper on SSRN without some additional promotion creates 
the possibility of high quality feedback, but my guess is that most papers 
produce few (if any) unsolicited comments. 
* * * 
In sum, intermediaries perform a variety of functions, some for good, and 
others for ill. Some of these functions, and particularly, the certification 
function, are deeply rooted in academic practices and traditions. Will Google 
hits ever replace good placements in the scheme of academic rewards? Maybe. 
But not anytime soon. 
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C. Dissemination 
The final topic in my investigation of the interaction of the short form, 
open access, and disintermediation and the ecology of the legal academy is 
dissemination. I have already touched on several of the themes that I raise here, 
but they need to be made explicit. 
1. Dissemination One: The Globalization of the Legal Academy 
My first point is about globalization. Despite the persistence of the global 
digital divide, access to the Internet at academic institutions is becoming 
ubiquitous on a global scale. There was a time when this would have been of 
little interest to most legal scholars. Comparativists might care, because their 
work depends on transnational communication. Internationists might care, 
because it is in the nature of international law that it transcends national 
boundaries. And scholars of the traditional common-law subjects might care, 
because there are still practices of cross-citation and influence among common-
law jurisdiction. But in the old world of descriptive doctrinal scholarship, the 
American legal academy was, for the most part, geographically isolated. Most 
law was “domestic,” creating a kind of acoustic separation between national 
communities of legal academics. 
But interdisciplinarity has changed all that. Law and economics. Law and 
philosophy. Law and positive political theory. Legal history. Empirical legal 
scholarship. Interdisciplinary legal scholarship is practiced transnationally. 
That means that there is a global audience for contemporary legal scholarship. 
Let me tell a story to illustrate this point. In December of 2005, I was at 
Sun-Yat Sen University in Guangzhou, China. I was speaking at a conference 
about law and economic development. The conference was aimed at Chinese 
legal academics, but several graduate and undergraduate law students were in 
attendance to observe and to serve as translators. At some point in the 
conference, someone asked me to meet with another group of students who 
were not in attendance at the conference. It turns out that these students—
mostly undergraduates—had downloaded some of my articles from SSRN. 
They were particularly interested in my work on virtue jurisprudence, because 
of the affinities between Aristotelian and Confucian legal theory. Some of these 
students were familiar with Legal Theory Blog, even though it is blocked 
(because it is hosted by blogspot.com) by the Chinese government. 
The globalization of legal scholarship requires open access. Cost barriers 
are significant even in the United States. For example, as you move from major 
research universities to regional universities to local colleges, the access of 
faculty and students to closed electronic databases (Westlaw, LexisNexis, 
JSTOR, etc.) begins to become very sketchy. In the least-developed countries, 
such access is virtually nonexistent. Internet access is affordable, but 
subscriptions to expensive proprietary online services are inconceivable. 
2. Dissemination Two: Legal Scholarship Wants to be Free 
The conventional wisdom is that information should be treated as a toll 
good. Information isn’t a private good because consumption of information is 
nonrivalrous. Exclusive legal rights can create excludability, and hence, 
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information can become a toll good. It should be treated as a toll good to create 
incentives for the creation of new information. Whatever we think about that 
story as a general matter, it has limited applicability to most contemporary legal 
scholarship—which is gifted rather than sold by its creators. In other words, 
legal scholarship wants to be free. Or to put the point less poetically, legal 
scholars want to be read. Exclusive rights are a barrier to readership. Open 
access removes the barriers created by exclusive rights. So, legal scholars want 
(or should) want open access. Q.E.D. 
3. Dissemination Three: Disintermediation and Immediacy 
The combination of the long form with intermediation has a dramatic 
effect on the pace of legal scholarship. Long form scholarship has long lead 
times. The traditional multivolume treatise took years or even decades to 
produce. The old fashioned “major law review article” could—under the best of 
circumstances—be written in a single year and published a few months later, 
but it frequently took three or more years from conception to publication. The 
contrast to short-form open access scholarship can be dramatic. The idea paper 
can be written and posted on SSRN in days or weeks. The blog post can be 
written and posted in minutes or hours. Back in the day, scholarly reaction to a 
Supreme Court decision began with the Supreme Court issue of the Harvard 
Law Review, published in the November issue, several months after the end of 
the Supreme Court’s term in late June or early July. 
In other words, disintermediation produces immediacy. Duh! It accelerates 
the speed at which ideas emerge, contend, die, and evolve. Scholarly debates 
that once took years—literally years—now can take place in days, weeks, or 
months. The recent controversy over Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s 
article on the death penalty24 is a wonderful illustration. Within days of the 
articles being posted on SSRN, a full-fledged debate broke out in the 
blogosphere,25 followed by more traditional debates in the pages of the law 
reviews.26 
A very dramatic example of the importance of immediacy is provided by 
the way that the blogosphere reacted to Judge Anna Diggs Taylor’s opinion in 
ACLU v. NSA. For example, Jack Balkin wrote, “Although the court reaches the 
right result—that the program is illegal, [sic] much of the opinion is 
disappointing, and I would even suggest, a bit confused.” The New York Times, 
 
 24 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
 25 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy, Cass Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeuele for the Death Penalty (March 23, 2005), http://volokh.com/archives/ 
archive_2005_03_20-2005_03_26.shtml#1111616457; Kieran Healy, Crooked Timber, 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty (March 24, 2005), http://crookedtimber.org/ 
2005/03/24/deterrence-and-the-death-penalty/#comments; Dan Merkel, PrawfsBlawg, 
Comments on Sunstein and Vermeule's Death Penalty Paper (May 4, 2005), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2005/05/comments_on_sun.html.  
 26 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: 
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005); Daniel R. 
Williams, The Futile Debate over the Morality of the Death Penalty: A Critical Commentary 
on the Steiker and Sunstein-Vermeuele Debate, 10 LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 625 (2006). 
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which had run an editorial lavishly praising the decision,27 then published a 
front page story that acknowledged the severe beating it had taken in the 
blogosphere.28 
4. Dissemination Four: An Objection and an Answer: “I Only Want to be 
Read by the ‘Right People’” 
One final point about dissemination. When I talk with other law professors 
about open access and blogging, I frequently encounter skepticism about the 
value of dissemination. This reaction takes on a particular form in discussions 
of the drawbacks of closed access peer-reviewed journals: 
“I only want to be read by the ‘right people.’” 
Let’s call this the “right-people thesis.” The idea behind the right-people thesis 
is that peer-reviewed journals create a community of high-quality readers—
tenured and tenure-track academics, who have access to these journals both in 
paper and electronic form. This may create barriers to access—for students, for 
everyone at non-elite institutions, and for almost everyone outside the most 
developed nations. 
Of course, there is something to the right-people thesis. Sophisticated legal 
scholarship is frequently technical and inaccessible to readers without extensive 
and intensive training. Even if it is accessible to readers outside the 
cognoscenti, it will be rare for someone outside the elite legal academy to make 
a significant new contribution to the most sophisticated scholarly debates. 
Rare. Difficult. Not nonexistent. Not impossible. Especially not now. 
Because the global Internet, the World Wide Web, and open access scholarship 
have opened new doors for the intelligent and ambitious. I strongly suspect that 
there is extraordinary talent located outside the elite legal academy of the most 
developed nations. The smart and motivated are everywhere. The “right 
people” are the people who can contribute significant new ideas to scholarly 
debates. And you never know where you will find them. Maybe in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, but maybe in Mumbai, Guangzhou, or Sophia. 
V. CONCLUSION: A SCHOLAR’S TALE 
The new world of legal scholarship is the world of the open access, 
disintermediated, short form. It’s the world of short papers on SSRN, blog 
entries, and wikis. It’s an open access world. And that world will be different in 
ways both simple and profound. It won’t just be a cut and paste job. Not just 
old wine in new vessels. 
 
27 Editorial, Ruling for the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A18, available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40D15FE3E5A0C7B8DDDA10894DE404
482. 
28 Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, Experts Fault Reasoning in Surveillance Decision, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
08/19/washington/19ruling.html?ei=5088&en=5f8f4b2cc84ad621&ex=1313640000&partner
=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print. 
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The new world of legal scholarship will be different in ways that we can 
only begin to imagine. I can’t tell you how that world will look, but I can tell 
you a story about how the new world of legal scholarship has affected me and 
the way that I do legal scholarship. Of course, I’ve been telling you that story 
all along. If you’ve read this far, then you’ve surely picked up on the fact this is 
isn’t your father’s law review article. Because blogging changed me and the 
way that I think about writing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here’s the story. When Larry Lessig published Free Culture, I decided 
that I wanted to blog about the book. Not 50 words, or 100 words, but an 
extended treatment. The result was a six part series of posts under the rubric, 
The Legal Theory Bookclub. It was blogging—so it was not your typical law 
review prose. When I blogged, I found a voice that sounded more like me—
more like the voice I use when I converse with colleagues about ideas. When 
the Texas Law Review approached me with the idea of publishing these posts, 
it seemed like a no brainer. Why not? And part of the “why not?” is that the 
University of Texas students wanted the blog posts—they wanted something 
that was outside the norm, that involved a more personal voice. 
And that experience has carried over to other writing. When I reviewed 
another one of Larry’s books for the Harvard Law Review in collaboration with 
Larry Alexander, the content and style of the review was influenced in myriad 
ways, both substantively and stylistically by my blogging. How can you keep 
them down on the farm once they’ve seen Paree? Once you’ve experienced the 
disintermediated short form, the long form will never be the same again. And 
the disintermediated short form has already arrived. 
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 I don’t pretend to know the future of legal scholarship, but I do know 
this. The future is not the one hundred page law review article. The future is not 
the editorial board. And one more thing. As Yoda might put it, “Open access, 
shall the future be.” 
 
